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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/04/2006 Accident number: 291 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 16/03/1992 
Where it occurred: not made available Country: Kuwait 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: KMOD 53/SER 44 Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K14
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Valmara 69 AP Bfrag Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
Accident report 
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The 
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made 
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in 
Kuwait at the time of the accident. 
The victim had arrived in Kuwait on 13th May 1991, so had been working there for ten 
months. 
1 
An ex-pat mine clearance team was clearing the forward edge of the main barrier minefield. 
The edge was sown with VS – T trip flares and V-69 bounding fragmentation mines, all with 
tripwires deployed. 
Operators had disarmed many V-69 mines but some had detonators that were stuck in place. 
These were placed in a designated area for disposal at the end of each day. At the end of the 
day, the team leader instructed all the other members to pack up the equipment while he went 
to the stock of V-69 bounding fragmentation mines a safe distance from the rest of the team 
to try to remove the remaining detonators, or to destroy the mines if this was not possible. 
Some det-wells were wet and after they had dried the detonators would drop out easily.  
It is variously reported that orders were varied (or that “Custom & Practice” had evolved) to 
allow the use of artery forceps (tweezers) to extract detonators. This speeded up the end-of-
day process. The victim had been tasked with removing those detonators that did not fall out 
easily.  
It is believed that the victim was using artery forceps to extract a detonator when he 
inadvertently prodded into it. The detonators are “stab-sensitive”. The mine activated and he 
was killed instantly. No details of his injuries were made available. 
The company’s managers denied knowing that artery forceps were used to extract 
detonators. Field people believe that this was a cynical attempt to save face. Field operatives 
claim that it was a known and approved short-cut to avoid having to prepare a controlled 
demolition at the end of each day. All sources to date report that it had been going on for 
weeks or months [depending on source] with the knowledge and approval of the management 
from Team-Leaders to “the top”. 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 367 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 




Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
Severe fatal injuries from blast and fragmentation. 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because 
the victim was tasked to carry out an activity that involved unacceptable risk whether or not 
forceps were used. 
2 
The change to using tweezers (forceps) to save time when removing detonators was 
apparently a move to copy US practice. Clearly the risk of prodding into a stab-sensitive 
detonator was not considered high. Those in management who made this decision bear some 
responsibility for the accident. The attempt to pretend that the change was not “formal” 
implies that some people recognised that responsibility belatedly.  
There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any 
reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.   
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